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and Athens, B.C.
a History Lesson

PAGES 7 and 15

What Protection Is There From H-Bomb "Fall-Out"?

The new dimension in atomic killing power requires thorough overhaul of civil defense

ALASKA AND HAWAII
The Folly of Statehood

by Richard Strout

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

We have come to associate McCarthy with Lincoln's birthday. He sprang to fame overnight February 9, 1950, in his Wheeling, West Virginia, speech; nearly every Lincoln's Birthday week since he has been out attacking Democrats' loyalty; now he is at it again, though circumstances have changed. Now it is a McCarthy-Matusow anniversary.

We suggested last week that there must have been an awkward pause in old Salem Village when the giggling schoolgirls who sent "witches" to hanging gave up their little joke. Now, as Harvey Matusow recants, we must all change the conversation quickly lest it be discovered that some of us are blushing. Turncoat Communists have been making a wonderful thing out of this business of being professional federal informers. The Salem schoolgirls weren't paid; our modern techniques have improved all that. What is the nation's annual informer budget, anyway? Paul Crouch earned $9,675 between July, 1952-May, 1954. But we imagine the genuine informer rises above petty mercenary considerations: he loves adulation, the TV spotlight, the praise of the hysterical press. In all this Matusow is an odd man; he has achieved not the double-cross but the triple-cross! He did a fine smear job in the West in the last election: he covered Wisconsin, Montana, Utah, Idaho and Washington out in the Nixon territory. Now he is a self-confessed liar, but for which side nobody can be sure. The point is that McCarthy, the GOP and the FBI, all used him and trusted him. An awkward moment if ever we saw one.

One of Washington's ablest commentators, Joseph C. Harsch, points out that the US now has a Pretender on its hands. He is Bonnie Prince Charlie Chiang, on Formosa. Victorious new regimes try to behead their predecessors; they feel no security till that is done. But outside allies of the old regime historically shelter and abet them: France nurtured the Stuarts and warred for their restoration; Britain gave refuge to surviving Bourbons; France and Britain together aided what was left of the Romanoffs. The outside friends generally try for a restoration. Now the US is caught in the old tradition: we have wanted to restore friendly Chiang. It should be understood that the bitterness this arouses in the successful new regime passes formal logic. No revolution feels safe while the exiled former head is backed by a powerful ally. America's moral position would be stronger in the present crisis if it publicly renounced any design to restore an exile by outside force.

Under a business administration in Washington the national business associations always seem to take on stronger coloration. The Catholic archdiocesan publication in Boston, *The Pilot*, has just had to denounce the National Association of Manufacturers for a booklet implying that religious teaching opposes the union shop and similar trade union practices. As for the US Chamber of Commerce, we listened to a speech by the new president, Clement Johnson, at the Press Club recently. Back in New Deal days Eric Johnston as head of the Chamber of Commerce was a left-winger compared to this new Johnson. Answering audience questions he said he supported Eisenhower policies, and then denounced the Eisenhower proposal to raise minimum wages to 90 cents an hour. He advocated a federal law making the union shop illegal; he said he was "shocked" that Labor Secretary Mitchell attacked the so-called "right-to-work" laws. On finances he favored a flat 25-percent cut in the federal budget. This could be made and the budget balanced, he said, without reducing military effectiveness. There was an odd echo in this latter proposal of Candidate Eisenhower in the 1952 campaign; guess nobody has told Johnson who won the election.

New York Post reporters Spivack and Shannon raised the question of "censorship" at Eisenhower's press conference last week but the President brushed it off. The TV executives, Ike retorted, hadn't protested the new White House practice of deleting what it wants from film and tape recordings of the Presidential press conferences before they are released for TV-radio use. Personally we regret turning the old press conferences into television shows. The decaying newspaper profession is being slowly pushed out by radio and television. The newcomers are able, alert, more self-possessed in televised questioning than newsmen and generally better paid, but their job is largely pictorial and representational. They want a nice color story or a good photographic image; radio and TV men do not dig out contradictions from politicians; they rarely crusade; they wait for reporters to do that. They like to take pictures of men asking questions; they do not care so much about asking questions themselves, or when they do of doggedly following up the replies with continuing questions. This is a politer day than under Roosevelt and Truman. Perhaps the reason is implied in statistics that came our way recently: there is now no substantial Democratic newspaper west of the Rockies. Most big newspapers today are Republican.

Notes: T. K. Quinn, former General Electric vice president, testified here last week there are now 68 "billionaire corporations"; they are social institutions of huge power and out of control of present archaic laws. . . . Democratic Chairman Paul Butler says he doesn't mind Eisenhower borrowing Democratic policies since he always returns them. . . . The percentage of federal jobs under civil service has dropped from 87 to 84 in the first two years of the Republican Administration. . . . Regulatory commissions are probably in for sharp scrutiny by the Senate Commerce Committee; they include the Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communications Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Maritime Administration; theoretically these agencies are the policemen for the consumers but their membership has been stacked more and more lately with anti-consumer personnel.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Can Diplomacy Avert All-Out War with China?

FOR MONTHS the Chinese Communists have been preparing for an invasion of the Tachen Islands. Now, unless they choose war, the Tachens will be theirs without a fight. Moscow has apparently urged Peking to sit out the evacuation. There is hope, if no assurance, that Peking will take Moscow's advice.

Peking has branded our evacuation in the Tachens as "war provocation." Few nations will agree, but Peking is right in identifying our move as "an act of participation in the Chinese Civil War." Normally, in the absence of an effective blockade, a nation may supply a belligerent without involvement. But we are engaging our military forces in a military operation, and our re-entry in the Chinese civil war is underscored by US and Nationalist use of the word "redeployment" in defining our purpose in evacuating Chiang's troops. They are being redeployed from the Tachens, which we will not defend, to Quemoy and Matsu which President Eisenhower has led the Nationalists to believe we will defend. And the offensive nature of this redeployment is heightened once again by Chiang's declaration to his troops that the day of reinvasion of the mainland is drawing near.

Communist planes may be shot down during the Tachen withdrawal and our ships sunk. Even so the Chinese Communists still can not reach our main forces from their coastal bases, and if we refrain from bombing those bases we can halt the progression toward an all-out war. If then, the Tachen evacuation is completed, six months or so may pass without fighting during which Peking prepares its attack upon Matsu and Quemoy. Peking will need that interval, for there is only one airfield today in the neighboring province of Fukien. There is no railroad on which to bring in fuel and supplies, and despite recent road construction highways are poor.

We may have then a brief respite in which to overcome the appalling isolation in which our Formosan policy has left the United States. How shall we use the time?

The Chinese Communists have ruled out Eisenhower's suggested exchange of the coastal islands for a cease-fire in the Formosa Straits. They have scorned all bargains involving Chinese territory, as the *New Republic* predicted they would. They have declared that their claim to Formosa is not negotiable. They have indicated that even United Nations membership with a seat on the Security Council holds no attraction for them while the Nationalists remain in the UN.

A UN cease-fire agreement was never probable. Even an endorsement of that objective by the UN majority would have aroused unease in Asia. For it would have meant a moral commitment from India, Burma, Indonesia and other nations to fight Peking if Peking should attack. And so the Chinese Communist rulers, perhaps to increase the profound reluctance of non-Communist Asia to fight Asia's leading nation, have informed the Asian governments of their intent to attack Formosa this year. UN endorsement of a cease-fire has been further undermined by President Eisenhower's deliberate vagueness on whether the US will or will not defend such offshore islands as Quemoy and Matsu.

But a UN cease-fire is not the only means by which the US can act to avert war, without at the same time abandoning Formosa to Communism. Peking may scorn the world organization from which it is excluded. But an alternative to war which Peking may be promoting, and which the free nations may have to accept, is a conference outside the UN. The Eisenhower Administration began by rejecting any such proposal. Now it has fallen silent. Lacking leadership from the President, the military are again voicing their traditional suspicion of diplomacy and most politicians express their view that negotiation is appeasement and appeasement is worse than war. Joseph Martin for one, who speaks for the President in the House of Representatives, looks with equanimity on war. We can whip the Chinese Communists within 30 days says Representative Martin, and without landing an American soldier on Chinese soil. Mr. Martin no doubt has in mind wiping out the cities of China with a half dozen or so hydrogen bombs in the belief that our cities, our alliances, and our faith will remain intact. If Martin speaks for the Congress and the country, there is indeed little hope.

Winter Book Number

NEXT week's special issue will include Thomas K. Finletter's discussion of *Two Minutes Till Midnight* by Elmer Davis; Charles B. Forcey's appraisal of Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy*; reviews by Paul Engle, Claude G. Bowers, Daniel Friedenberg; essays by Peter Viereck, Leon Edel, H. C. Webster, Jay Leyda, Delmore Schwartz, Eric Bentley; and a new poem by Randall Jarrell.

British Approach

A SERIOUS split has appeared between the British Government and the Opposition on the handling of Red China for the first time since Labour recognized Mao at the beginning of 1950. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden is clearly working for the juridical separation of Formosa and the Pescadores from the mainland and the offshore islands, while Clement Attlee, ironically agreeing with the US Administration, insists that Formosa and the Pescadores are both part of China, and that America is intervening in a civil war. In this situation, where the legal position is so confused, it is essential to see the Formosa crisis within its world context.

Mutual fear of the hydrogen bomb has imposed peaceful co-existence on both sides in the Cold War. Co-existence can only be established at first on the basis of a *status quo* in which the dividing line runs through the middle

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of some countries—like Germany, Korea and Indo-China. The main aim of British policy in the last 12 months has been to disengage the opposing forces in these divided countries and to persuade both sides that further changes can be brought about only by peaceful negotiation, and not by force. This was particularly difficult in Indo-China, where the Cold War was being fought out locally as a civil war. In the case of China, too, all parties must be made to realize that any attempt to produce a major change in the present situation by force will create a real danger of atomic world war. This must rule out the idea of seeking to establish moral or juridical rights by the use of arms. And the first step toward co-existence must be a cease-fire and disengagement.

The problem is physically simplified in China since 70 miles of open sea separate the Pescadores from the island fringe of the mainland. A few weeks ago it seemed likely that Eisenhower was going to obtain a cease-fire by ordering China to evacuate the coastal islands in return for firm American support in the defense of his main stronghold. But ambiguity about the coastal islands, combined with an increase in Chiang's forays against the mainland, has meant that a policy aimed at relaxing tension has actually increased the risk of war.

Europe has drawn comfort from the fact that at least the China lobby has not dared to press for greater American commitments still. But in Asia, where the subtleties of Congressional behavior are less carefully studied, the consequences could be disastrous. For nearly a year the West has been trying to produce a situation in which Asian opinion would judge any new act of aggression by Communist China realistically instead of discounting it as a pardonable reaction to American provocation. Since the West, and above all America, has shown itself unwilling to provide its own forces for security in Asia, any political or military progress depends on first obtaining this psychological transformation in Asian thinking. Now once again a careless American action has muddied the waters and given Communist China the benefit of Asian doubts.

It is fortunate for Britain that the Formosan crisis happened to coincide with a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers—not least because this reduces the danger of a premature private initiative by Nehru. But there has been much misgiving in London about Britain's support for attempting to obtain a cease-fire through the United Nations, where the juridical confusion over China and Formosa can so easily be used to hamper serious negotiation. Nonetheless, most observers believe it should not be difficult to obtain a *de facto* cease-fire based on evacuating all the off-shore islands. To pass from this to the *de jure* separation of Formosa from China will not be easy so long as America treats Chiang as the Government of Formosa and Chiang regards himself as the Government of China.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

Delivering the Bomb

US SUPERIOR military power is based on a huge atomic stockpile, aircraft which can deliver A- and H-bombs anywhere, and peripheral airbases around the Soviet Union. A recent estimate by a non-governmental atomic scientist, based on four separate methods of computation, is that we now have about 10,000 atomic weapons, plus or minus 20 percent (the fissionable material in them can be used to make hydrogen weapons). Best estimates are that Soviet atomic weapons still are numbered in the low hundreds.

As to the means of delivery, the US has wings of intercontinental B-36 bombers, and more than a thousand six-jet medium B-47 bombers. Even the latter, with in-flight refueling, can reach any point in the Soviet Union from peripheral bases.

The Russians have little in the way of long-range bombers, except some 700 of their copy of the US B-29, with which our own Air Force would never dream of trying to penetrate even the poorly defended Soviet territory. Medium and heavy jet bombers with characteristics similar to those of the US B-52 heavy bomber and B-47 medium bomber are now being built in Russia; but these will not come into inventory in sufficient quantities to be a threat for three to five years.

Defensively, the US has a tremendous geographical advantage. Bomber paths from the Soviet Union, which run only from Eastern Siberia and Northwestern Russia, pass either over the territories of our allies, or over Alaska and the Aleutians, making possible a warning system (now being built) thousands of miles away, as well as advanced defenses. On the other hand, bombers can enter the Soviet Union at any point along its 14,000 mile periphery. Nor can a border of such extent be defended, or even provided with an early warning system. As a result most Soviet air defense takes the form of close-in regional set-ups, without the advantage of possible early destruction of raiders before they reach their targets.

Compared to the USSR, the US today is then a relatively secure arsenal. But this situation will change as the Soviet Union builds both a stockpile (not necessarily as big as ours, but large enough to be a major threat) and the means to deliver these weapons. Russian sub-

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marines capable of launching guided missiles already are in existence and the aircraft are being built. It is to this potential threat that scientist Ralph Lapp calls attention in his article in this issue (page 8) on the hazards of H-bomb "fall-out" and the necessity for a complete overhaul of our civilian defense system.

Italian Flirtation

While You Weren't Looking

A YEAR ago the Spanish dictator flounced onto the Mediterranean stage in Mussolini's tragi-comic guise as Protector of Islam. A broadcast in Arabic beamed to the Near East by Rome Radio on January 7, 1955, indicates there may still be aspirants to the role in official quarters in Italy. The broadcast was reminiscent of the most vicious excesses of Fascist propaganda in the Duce's heyday.

> The Jews [said the speaker] are the worst enemies of Islam and will remain so to the end of the world. Allah himself warned us of the menace they represent. . . .
>
> To be safe we must beware of them even when they are weak and prepare against them when they are strong. If you study them closely you will see the vice in their hearts. . . . Satan is in possession of their souls and it is he who pushes them to pretend that they are blessed by God. . . .

The inaccuracy of certain Koranic references in the talk and suggestive stylistic clues indicate that its original author was not a Moslem Arab. There can be little doubt that it was based on an Italian draft. The Italian authorities are, therefore, debarred in advance from pleading that the broadcast was put out by an Arab speaker without their prior approval. In any case, all scripts prepared within Rome Radio's Overseas Service, which is under the direct control of the Italian Foreign Ministry, have to be approved by a senior official.

It would be interesting to know the name of the official who sanctioned this talk—at a time when other Italian spokesmen were expressing their pleasure at the presence in Italy of the Jew Mendès-France, himself under fire on "racial" grounds from leading Arab radio stations. Can some primitive mind in Rome have conceived this broadcast as a crude means of "reinsuring" Italy in Moslem North African eyes?

The Near East is a subject on which Italian officials are extraordinarily sensitive. Not unnaturally, they find it difficult to accept the fact that Italy is an extremely unpopular power to Arabs—partly because of her colonization of Libya, partly because she is identified with that particular branch of Christianity whose doctrines are most offensive to the strictly monotheistic Moslems and with which they have most often clashed militarily and politically. (However hard expediency may press Arab delegates to canvass Catholic states' votes at the UN on such issues as Jerusalem this fundamental gulf is never forgotten.) There is also Rome's perennial desire to outbalance Yugoslavia and Greece and to enjoy parity (at least) with Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean affairs. The Turkish Prime Minister's tour of the area and Marshal Tito's decision to visit Cairo are spurring Italian diplomacy to a fresh effort to stake a claim for itself.

Anti-Jewish broadcasts are, however, unlikely to commend Italian statesmanship to the Turkish authorities who have themselves broken with Moslem fanaticism and are trying to persuade their Arab neighbors to do likewise; nor will they convince Egypt's Colonel Abdel-Nasser, himself at grips with Moslem obscurantists, that Italy has much in the way of political enlightenment to offer the Near East.

Retiring Farmers

PROBABLY 1957 will see many an older farmer retiring from the fields, possibly half a million or more. This will be an unprecedented exodus, and its effects, oddly enough, will begin to be felt in the market place before it happens.

Beginning this year, farmers for the first time come under Social Security; they can qualify for full retirement benefits in 18 months. To receive benefits they must be 65 and have paid the 3 percent Social Security tax on earnings for 6 quarters. Their monthly benefits after retirement will be determined by the size of their earnings during the coming 2 years—benefits run from $45 per month for a farmer and wife who make $600 a year net, up to $162 a month for those making $4,200 a year and up.

Those who plan to retire will find it wise then to liquidate farm stock and otherwise boost their earnings in every possible way during the coming 2 years (some have held over 1954 stocks to sell this year). The 1955 and 1956 livestock markets will reflect their efforts.

In 1950, the census listed 786,000 farmers who were 65 years old or over. One million more were between 55 and 65; at least 200,000 of them are now 65. Retirement will appeal to many of these. Farming is hard work for a man in his sixties, and Social Security terms are attractive: in addition to the monthly benefits, farmers will be allowed to collect whatever rent they can to earn up to $1200 (no more than $100 a month) per year.

Return to Stalinism

EARLY reports from the budget meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR indicate that the shift from Premier Malenkov's soft economic policy to Communist Party Secretary Khrushchev's tough one (*NR*, February 7) will be even more drastic than was previously supposed. Promises of "abundant" consumer goods, made directly after Stalin's death, have been shelved, and production once again will be concentrated on "heavy" and war goods—ostensibly because of "frenzied imperialist preparations for war" taking place in the Western world.

For the satellite nations the shift forecasts new deprivation. For Russians it indicates not only a blighting of hopes for higher living standards but also a tightening of political controls, for the return to Stalinism is associated with the rise of another would-be Stalin in Nikita Khrushchev.

Khrushchev has even repeated history by giving William Randolph Hearst Jr. two exclusive interviews calculated for foreign consumption. The first, apparently intended to counteract his bad press overseas, contained some rough-hewn compliments for the United States. Then, in what amounted to a second take of Stalin's interview with Roy Howard of March 5, 1936, Khrushchev reduced Mr. Hearst to silence with a spate of double-talk on the peace and prosperity attendant on an expansion of Soviet heavy industry. Khrushchev added that reports of friction between himself and Malenkov (*NR*, February 7) represented wishful thinking in the capitalist press.

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Federal License for a Dog-Fight

THIS YEAR, as the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee opens an investigation of all federal regulatory commissions, the natural gas industry and the railroads are taking the lead in what veteran observers believe will be a concerted attack upon the very principle of federal regulation of interstate commerce. Such regulation is required of Congress by the Constitution. But the industrial revolution, and this nation's mushrooming economy, made it so technical and time-consuming a task, that Congress, toward the end of the last century, began setting up full-time Commissions to do the job. The first of these, created in 1887 expressly to regulate railroads, was the Interstate Commerce Commission, the last, so far, is the Atomic Energy Commission (1946). Both, and all those established in between, have been given a Republican overhaul during the past two years, and now, beginning with the old ICC and the Federal Power Commission, they are going to get the full treatment.

Last year, dominated by Eisenhower appointees, the FPC tried to surrender its authority over the natural gas industry. Consumers appealed to the Supreme Court and won against politicians and lobbies. But the gas and oil men (they are the same) were not discouraged: they prepared for this year a full-dress propaganda campaign (TRB, *NR*, Jan. 24). Now they have been joined by the railroads—who are fortunate in having as their spokesmen in attacking the ICC, 5 of the 10 members of the President's Cabinet (the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, Treasury, and Agriculture and the Postmaster General) as well as the Defense Mobilizer and the Budget Director.

Railroad men have been very unhappy since 1952. They contributed heavily to Eisenhower's campaign and all they have got in return so far is the St. Lawrence Seaway, with which they will have to compete, and talk of a highway program, which will benefit another competitor, the truck-lines. Sensitive to these complaints, Eisenhower set up last year, on the same day he formally proposed his $50 billion highway plan, a very special "Cabinet Committee on Transportation Policy and Organization." No secret was made of the fact that the job of this star-studded group was to help the railroads—to write a report in broad enough terms to cover the whole transportation industry, yes; but to help the railroads. That report was due December 1, 1954. But apparently the boys got carried away, for when Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks first presented it to the full Cabinet at a White House meeting last year he was asked to take the report back and tone it down a bit.

It's ready again, and the President soon will be sending it to Congress with the request that it be turned into legislation. The key provisions are these: (1) the railroads themselves, not the ICC as at present, are to set their rates; the ICC may "review" them if there are serious complaints; and (2) railroads may invade other fields of transportation: buy trucking lines, barge lines, airlines, etc. —which they are now forbidden to do.

The report really grants these new freedoms to all parts of the transportation industry, but so far only the railroads want them. Take truckers, for example. They would like to set their own rates, charge whatever the market will bear, but they want the ICC to establish minimum rates. Otherwise the wide-flung and wealthy railroads can pick out one trucker at a time and underbid him in his area, making up the loss throughout the rail system, until he goes broke or, under the second new freedom, sells out to the railroad—which can then use his trucks to undercut the next trucker. The report, say the truckmen, gives railroads "a hunting license."

To get these proposals through Congress—one of the highest hurdles will be Sen. Warren Magnuson's (D, Wash.) Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee—the railroad men and their allies will argue that whereas federal regulation of rates and expansion may have been justified when railroads were the only major inland transportation, competition of trucks, barges and airlines now makes it unnecessary, even harmful.

But consumer groups—led by farm organizations—who oppose the report's recommendation, say this argument is fallacious. The proposals themselves, they say, provide railroads with the means to destroy or subjugate competition. And they point out that existing competition only got started after the discriminatory rate practices of railroads had so hampered the economic and industrial development of the West and South that the government was forced to step in; government intervention and the resentment of those in the discriminated-against regions (which persists to this day) then created an opening for alternatives as they were developed—inland waterways, trucks, planes, etc. Within the framework of regulation, these can compete effectively with one another, without getting into a price-cutting dog-fight, the chief instrument of which must again be rate discrimination, harmful to the whole economy. Without regulation, say these public groups, a dog-fight is certain, and the small temporary advantage of low prices the public might enjoy would be quickly offset by very high prices as soon as the fight ended.

As a counter to the report, its opponents are preparing 3 proposals:

1. A census of transportation in the US (authorized by Congress once but never undertaken because of lobby opposition) to discover just what this nation has in the way of transport.
2. The establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Transportation, with a permanent professional staff to advise Congress on this technical subject and so free it from the need to decide policy solely on the basis of endless conflicting testimony repeated before two separate Congressional committees.
3. The naming of a qualified, non-political Commission to study present and probable future transportation needs of the nation, and to advise on which of those needs can be most economically met by which form of transport, so that future policy decisions can be based on fact instead of propaganda.

The President's Program

THREE more Eisenhower proposals—on health, highways and school construction—will be analyzed in forthcoming issues by Dr. Max Seham, practicing physician and member of the board of the Committee for the Nation's Health; Dewey Anderson, director of the Public Affairs Institute; and Edgar Fuller, executive officer for the State Commissioners and Superintendents of Education.

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431 B.C.—The Downfall of a Democratic State

Thucydides tells the story of Athen's attack on far-distant Sicily. And how the most powerful enemy of Athens lay back in wait, and then, when Athens had been weakened by conflict, struck. In the end, the once dominant Athenians were crushed—"with a total destruction."

Confronted by a common threat from the barbarians, the Hellenic cities that now form part of Greece joined in an alliance lead by Lacedaemon. But following victory, the alliance fell apart; the 30-year truce was broken and in 431 B.C. the Peloponnesian wars began.

In the winter of 416 B.C. the Athenians resolved in addition to undertake a new war against far-off Sicily. Nicias, who had been chosen against his will to command the expedition, declared:

"Although this Assembly was convened to consider the preparations to be made for sailing to Sicily I think notwithstanding that we still have this question to examine, whether it be better to send out the ships at all, and that we ought not to give so little consideration to a matter of such moment, or let ourselves be persuaded by foreigners into undertaking a war with which we have nothing to do.

". . . The Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered; while failure would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied before the enterprise.

". . . Instead of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to overconfidence and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians . . . is how they may even now if possible overthrow us and repair their dishonor; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily but how to defend ourselves most effectively against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.

"We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf instead of using them on behalf of exiles who can do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger with others, who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with them."

"Such," records Thucydides, "were the words of Nicias"; he continues:

> By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was Alcibiades, son of Clinias who wished to thwart Nicias as his political opponent . . . and who was besides exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes.

Alcibiades rose to reply. He cried:

". . . [Do not] rescind your resolution to sail to Sicily on the ground that you would be going to attack a great power. The cities in Sicily are peopled by motley rabbles and easily change their institutions and adopt new ones in their stead; and consequently the inhabitants, being without any feeling of patriotism, are not provided with arms for their persons and have not regularly established themselves on the land. . . . From a mob like this you need not look for either unanimity in counsel or concert in action; but they will probably one by one come in as they get a fair offer; especially if they are torn by civil strife as we are told. Moreover the Siceliots have not so many heavy infantry as they boast . . . and . . . we shall have the help of many barbarians, who from their hatred of the Syracusans will join us in attacking them. . . .

"In this state of things . . . what excuse can we offer to our allies in Sicily for not helping them? . . . We did not take them into alliance to have them help us in Hellas but that they might so annoy our enemies in Sicily as to prevent them from coming over here and attacking us. It is thus that empire has been won. . . . Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior but often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others we are in danger of being ruled ourselves."

Alcibiades won. Nicias, defeated, warned simply of the strength of Sicily and pleaded for the largest possible forces. Thus, notes Thucydides, he hoped to discourage the Athenians. Instead Thucydides records:

> All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they would . . . with so large a force meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a longing for foreign sights and spectacles; while the idea of the common people and the soldiers was to earn wages at the moment and make conquests that would supply a never-ending fund of pay for the future. With this enthusiasm of the majority the few that liked it not feared to appear unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it and so kept quiet.

Athens organized a fleet that Thucydides called "by far the most costly and splendid Hellenic force that had ever been sent out by a single city up to that time."

Syracuse was aroused and strengthened by the threat of invasion. The Egestaeans in contrast failed to meet their promises to Athens of allies and aid. The Athenians plundered the coastal cities of Syracuse; they won a battle at Catana, but they gained no military decision. When winter passed they set out from Catana laying waste the plains of Sicily and setting fire to the corn. But the Syracusans were only stirred to greater resistance, and meanwhile Lacedaemon resumed its struggle against Athens. "Summer and winter the Athenians were worn out," Thucydides records. He explains:

> But what most oppressed them was that they had two wars at once and had thus reached a pitch of frenzy which no one would have believed possible if he had heard of it before it had come to pass.

The Athenian armies suffered setbacks but Nicias would not concede his weakness. Next Syracuse defeated the Athenian navies that had been masters of the sea. So the time came when the fate of Athens came to rest on the outcome of one decisive battle which the Athenians lost. "They were beaten at all points and altogether," Thucydides writes,

> They were destroyed with a total destruction; their fleet, their army—everything was destroyed and few out of the many returned home.

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

A "SUPER-SUPER-BOMB" — about 3 times more powerful than the one tested last year on the Marshall Islands — is spoken of by the Atomic Energy Commission. What new hazards to life do such bombs present; what protection is possible?

"FALL-OUT" Another Dimension in Atomic Killing Power

by Ralph E. Lapp

THE first A-bomb which shattered Hiroshima struck out at its victims over about seven square miles. Compared with the TNT blockbuster this primitive nuclear weapon constituted a "quantum jump" in the instruments of war. On November 1, 1952, a much more powerful bomb spread its blast-heat punch over 300 square miles. This was Quantum Jump Number Two. The world did not have long to wait for Number Three. It came on March 1, 1954, with a fall-out of radioactive particles over thousands of square miles of the Pacific Ocean.

The lethal radioactive fall-out of Quantum Jump Number Three is still too recent to appreciate fully. Indeed, most people have scarcely begun to comprehend the meaning of Hiroshima, let alone the more recent event which dwarfs it in significance. And dwarf it, it does. Fall-out adds a new dimension to war. A single superbomb, exploded close to the ground, can now contaminate a state the size of Maryland with lethal radioactivity.

Dr. Ralph E. Lapp, noted physicist and lecturer, is author of The New Force. *His article was written originally for, and will appear in, the February* Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Technical Considerations

The November, 1954, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* stated that about 4,000 square miles could be contaminated with serious-to-lethal radioactivity by the March 1 explosion. It emphasized that this was a conservative estimate. Using more recent data, this calculation can be refined. When a bomb is dropped, the sequence of events is as follows:

1. The exploding superbomb produces a three to four mile diameter fireball, which, unless it is exploded as a very high air burst, will touch the earth's surface.
2. As the blast-heat of the explosion craters the surface below the bomb, it dislodges millions of tons of surface earth and substratum.
3. The glowing fireball rises skyward and sucks up in its column debris from the crater. Massive chunks of

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debris fall back to earth promptly but lighter particles are churned into the fireball and coated with the prodigious quantities of radioactivity created by the fission process.

4. Split atoms of uranium or *fission products* adhere to the debris, the smaller particles carrying less radioactivity than the more massive ones which have more surface area. The "hot" debris is swept upwards to the stratosphere where it is dispersed downwind by the high winds aloft.

5. As the bomb cloud sweeps downwind there is a continual "fall-out" of the radioactive particles, the heavier ones falling first while the lighter particles drift farther downwind.

6. The pattern of the fallout area is roughly elliptical.

Not all the radioactive particles come to earth in the fall-out which concerns us. Some radioactive debris falls back into the crater area and much of it is carried on such tiny particles that they are wafted around the world without descending. Stratospheric winds of 50 knots are not uncommon over the United States, so that the "hot" cloud could travel 200 miles in several hours. Assuming an ellipse width of 50 miles and a length of 200 miles, this would correspond to an area of about 8,000 square miles.

Assume then that the bomb is of the general type as that detonated in the Castle Series in March-April of last year. Assume further that the pertinent energy release is 8 megatons (8 million tons of TNT). The exposure one would receive if one stayed in the contaminated area for an infinite length of time is 2500 roentgens, which corresponds to a 1-hour activity of 500 roentgens per hour. Roentgen, as used here, applies to the integrated exposure from one hour to eternity.

Naturally as time passes the intensity drops sharply. From one hour to one year there would be a 50,000-fold reduction in the level of contamination. *Yet, even at the end of one year the rate would exceed that set as safe for laboratory workers today.*

About one-half of the eternity dose of radioactivity is delivered in the first day—the time of maximum danger from fall-out. Although the intensity then drops sharply, it does not drop to zero. At 50 years, seven and one-half percent of the eternity dose remains.

Implications for Civil Defense

Let us consider the fate of one person, call him Mr. A, who panics and attempts to flee from the fall-out area. Assume that Mr. A seeks no shelter and flees on foot (perhaps having been caught in a traffic jam). Assume that he walks or runs all day, spending nine hours in the hot area before finally reaching a non-contaminated place or before someone forces him to take shelter. At an intensity of 55 roentgens per hour, at the end of one hour he would have had a dose of 930 roentgens—the lethal dose is 400 to 500 roentgens. His panic or his ignorance would have cost him his life.

Consider now the case of Mr. B who is alerted by the thunder-clap of the explosion and fortunately being out of immediate blast-damage range seeks shelter. A prudent man, he has prepared a simple basement shelter to which he takes his family and food and water to last for two days. After two days he emerges, receives an advisory on his battery-powered radio, and then either stays put or travels to a safe area. He will have received very slight radiation while sheltered. In traversing the contaminated area after two days he could go a full day without radiation injury.

These two cases illustrate that the maximum peril from fall-out is concentrated in the first day, or in the most heavily contaminated area, in the first two days. This does not mean that the danger has vanished after two days, for one still has to contend with the remaining half of the radiation. But since this is delivered more slowly over a period of weeks and months, it is not an acute hazard, although it cannot be disregarded.

Mr. B in our example was fortunate because he had a prepared shelter with sufficient shielding to protect against the penetrating rays in the fall-out. Very few people today can claim to be Mr. B. This raises the question as to what people can do if there are no good shelters available. The question can be answered in a word: *improvise*. Dr. Willard F. Libby, in one of his first speeches as an Atomic Energy Commissioner, wisely pointed out: "The radiological hazard of atomic weapons is something one can do something about."

Doing something about the fall-out involves (*a*) action during the acute phase of the hazard, *i.e.*, the first few days, and (*b*) measures applicable to the non-acute radioactive hazard.

Obviously, if one knows where to flee one can escape from the fall-out region. But this is rather a risky undertaking once the bomb has been detonated and fall-out has begun. People within the shadow of the H-cloud should seek emergency shelter as quickly as possible.

The fundamental rule of survival then is: *get below the surface of the earth*—a basement under a multi-story house, the fruit cellar of a farm house, or simply any hole in the ground. When one gets his head below the earth's surface he ducks out of the "illumination" of the radioactive rays from the surrounding area and reduces his dose very greatly. Even a hastily scooped out foxhole affords good protection. It is true that some fall-out will descend upon the occupant but a coat stretched across the top for a few hours and then discarded will minimize later exposure.

If no emergency shelter is available and time does not permit digging a foxhole (or where soil and weather conditions deter such excavation) one may seek second-class protection in a structure like a barn. Radioactive particles falling on the roof still irradiate the individual but they are farther away and the distance is a substitute for solid shielding. Furthermore, the refugees in the barn can improvise shelters inside. Having a roof over your head,

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

Courtesy US Air Force

An artist's conception of the fireball of the 1952 thermonuclear detonation—3¼ miles in diameter—over the New York City skyline.

even though your head is not below the earth's surface, has the decided advantage that it protects from direct contamination by the particles themselves. By keeping the radioactive debris from touching the body, one eliminates the hazard of the short-range beta particles which would otherwise cause beta-burns on the skin.

An analogy may prove useful in illustrating the fall-out radiation. When a plane surface like an open field is covered with an invisible mantle of radioactivity, one has an "infinite plane" (so dear to physicists) as the source of radiation; which means that if you stand in the middle of the field you receive radiation from all parts of the field, more from close by and, of course, less from the more remote parts. Substitute for the invisible mantle a huge array of incandescent bulbs. Standing in the midst of this blazing field of illumination you will receive light from every part of the field. Now duck below the earth's surface into a foxhole and you will cut down your exposure enormously, although you will still receive some scattered light. In the case of gamma rays scattered in the air, the amount of penetrating radiation which "looks in" the foxhole should be small.

A simple calculation shows that a person standing in an open field, uniformly contaminated with the fall-out, receives 50 percent of his radiation from the fall-out which is over 25 feet away from him. Further calculation shows that a person in a normal basement (below the level of surrounding terrain) would be exposed to only less than one-third the above-the-ground hazard. The smaller the basement the better the protection will be for there will be less overhead illumination. On this basis a foxhole, with its small "entrance" for radiation is better protection than a basement. And a foxhole dug in the basement or a basement corner room extension would be even better protection. Overhead protection with earth or concrete is desirable but it is surprising how much protection is afforded by the simple expedient of getting below the earth's surface.

Imagine that one hour after the fall-out each electric lamp in our radiation field glows at a 100-watt level. At the end of one day the level will drop to 2.2 watts; in other words, the intensity will drop 45-fold in the first day. With such a drop-off in intensity one can emerge from the "shelter phase" of civil defense and begin "to do something" more actively. If you were a farmer with a tractor and plow you could "plow under" the contamination. This would be the equivalent to "dimming" the lights. One would not have to dim all the lights for those closest to you would be most important.

Take the case of a man who lives in a New England community. He is apt to be caught in a multiple fall-out, *i.e.*, he may be in an area where fall-out from more than one bomb occurs. To travel to a non-contaminated region—say Canada or the Adirondacks—might be unwise. Yet to stay put is most uncomfortable, especially in a foxhole. A home owner could return to his house, if it survives, and begin decontamination. Sweeping down the roof would be the most urgent task. A good stiff sweep-down would remove much of the radioactivity. Then the surrounding hard surfaces like the street and driveway could be swept and the sweepings buried in the lawn or flushed into a sewer. The lawn should be thoroughly turned over with a spade. Even raking would help.

Care should be taken to minimize direct contamination of the body, especially when sweeping. Using a simple face mask and afterwards discarding clothing will be effective measures. Inadequate unclassified information exists upon which to base a realistic evaluation of the inhalation hazard of fall-out radioactivity. Entry of the particles into the lungs can undoubtedly be minimized with filters and masks.

The reason for decontaminating your immediate environment becomes clear if you think about the "accumulated dose." Suppose you emerge after two days during which time you have received little, if any, radiation. The radiation level has dropped from its initial one hour rate of 500 r/hr to about 5 r/hr. Such a level is still respectable but one can work around the house for a few hours without serious injury. If one did not undertake decontamination measures to clean up the radioactive contamination, then a significant amount of radiation would be delivered to a person who lived in the house during the next week. One might receive as much as 250 roentgens during this time.

A community which is left untouched (*i.e.*, no decontamination measures are undertaken) and which experienced a fall-out corresponding to our initial one hour rate of 500 r/hr would have a radiation level of about one r/hr at the end of one week and 0.2 r/hr at the end of a month. In the interval from the first week to the first month the accumulated dosage would amount to 230

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roentgens. From the first month to the end of the year would add 265 more roentgens. While such dosages would probably not cause death (since they are delivered over a long period of time and the body "forgets" some of the radiation it receives) they are very definitely unhealthy amounts of radiation.

Thus, unless a community is decontaminated, it might be uninhabitable for a considerable period of time, ranging up to several months. One cannot escape the conclusion that many metropolitan areas will become a kind of no man's land should they become heavily contaminated. People might enter them for limited periods of time but they would not be habitable in the ordinary sense of the word.

A city, especially one smashed into rubble, would be almost impossible to decontaminate. It would seem that the wisest thing to do with the central city would be to level it with demolition charges and bulldozers and cover it with earth, converting it into a huge metropolitan park. Moreover, the doughnut nature of the restored city would serve as a grim reminder to city planners on how to design cities of the future. In some cases nature would solve the problem by creating lakes in the craters formed where the business centers once stood. One would expect such metropolitan lakes in low-lying areas like Detroit, Chicago, Baltimore, and in other seaboard cities with business districts close to sea level.

If the US Is Attacked

This then, is the nature of the radioactive fall-out. Let us now examine the impact of a small-scale nuclear attack upon continental USA. Because Soviet military planners would probably be reluctant to abandon the traditional use of an explosive as a blast agent, the assumption is made that a bomb is dropped over the following target cities: On the eastern coast—Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston; Inland —Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Louisville, Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Akron, Buffalo, and Syracuse. This would total 18 bombs. Then to maximize fall-out and strike at a myriad of smaller targets, bombs would be dropped in the following areas: west of Chicago, over South Bend, over Grand Rapids, over Ft. Wayne, near Elmira, west of Washington, west of New York, over Springfield, near Albany, and over Allentown. These 10 additional bombs would be dropped in such a way as to have the prevailing winds blanket dense metropolitan areas in an unseen mist of radioactivity.

This "small-scale" attack with 28 bombs restricted to the industrial heart of America could produce an inverted L-shaped pattern over the northeastern states and an irregular fall-out bracketing much of Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. The "atomized" area would normally be occupied by 50 million Americans. Over two-thirds of the US industrial production centers in the same areas. This is the magnitude of the problem. This is what the third quantum jump in modern weaponry means.

Moreover, the time factor—the persistence of radioactivity—adds a new dimension to warfare. It adds a *denial* factor for many homes are denied the dispossessed. Many factories, even though intact and even though manpower might be summoned, utilities restarted, and feed material scrounged up, would be "out of commission." That the US industrial colossus could be so paralyzed is incredible but, unfortunately, true.

Confronted with the overwhelming magnitude of fall-out hazard, the Federal Civil Defense Administration must feel that it has been admitted to the Anteroom to Hell. Civil defense plans had no sooner been formulated to deal with Hiroshima situations than they were obsolete. Then as some FCDA planners struggled manfully to revise thinking to adjust to megaton-class weapons, along came fall-out. It is easy to understand why much of the civil defense in this country is of the World War Two-and-a-Half type. Events have come too fast to adjust to quantum jumps.

Thus it is a good time for a thorough house-cleaning in the civil defense establishment. An inventory should be made to see what measures are in the hopeless or useless category. Since so much of the C.D. measures have focused upon disaster relief these should be carefully assessed. Should we plan elaborate fire-fighting defenses if no one can venture into the area for two days? A host of other questions need realistic assessment.

Probably the greatest single question revolves about the principle of pre-attack evacuation of target areas. Is this still a valid program or has fall-out killed its chances



Courtesy US Air Force

An aerial view of the coral atoll after the "hydrogen" detonation in 1952. The island target has completely disappeared. Superimposed over the 175 foot deep crater are scale drawings of 14 Pentagons (the Pentagon is the world's largest office building, covering 32 acres).

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of success? One does not need an electronic brain to answer this question. As pointed out in the article in the November *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* too much of our urban population is concentrated in such a few targets. One simply cannot expose these populations to the unavoidable primary effects of superbombs—in other words, staying put is the worst possible policy. To minimize destruction by blast and heat the central urban populations have to be dispersed to sites where they can survive being crushed or burned. Naturally, an evacuated population which escapes blast and heat is by no means safe. It has yet to hurdle the invisible barrier of radioactivity. In many communities those who are evacuated upwind will be out of the fall-out region and there is even hope that preferential evacuation may be possible, *i.e.,* deployment of the people in an upwind direction. This will be more precarious in regions such as Ohio and New England where you might evacuate upwind of one target into the downwind region of another.

I believe that it has become mandatory that the government begin construction of an extensive system of survival shelters on the periphery of every large city. While evacuees might improvise shelter it is far more desirable to have reinforced concrete shelters built in a cordon eight miles or more from the city center. These need not be plush or elaborate shelters. Simple flush-to-the-surface concrete shelters with additional earth shielding will provide real protection. These shelters can be built on public land in school playgrounds, under suburban parking areas, in between divided highways, on park property and on golf courses. Such a shelter program together with minimal numbers of radiation measurement devices need not exceed a total investment of $2 billion.

Wide World

Victim of "fall out" from the H Bomb explosion in the Pacific last March, Aikichi Kuboyama was chief radio operator of a Japanese fishing vessel which was showered with radioactive dust.

At the same time all new construction, whether for industry, for government, or for homes, should be scrutinized from the over-all viewpoint of national vulnerability. New industrial plants must be dispersed—this has been obvious for ten years—but, in addition, they must be equipped with adequate shelters for their workers. Each plant should be prepared to shelter all of its worker force for one week and should provide for this emergency.

It should be made mandatory that every new house outside the central city should be built with a special shelter room in the basement, just as was done in Germany before the Allied air blitz began. Sanity would dictate that any new construction within the central city should be undertaken only if it reduces population density in that region.

Both the policies of evacuation and of dispersion are still valid although they have to be coupled to a realistic shelter program.

But most of all, the government has to conduct the most carefully planned and thoroughly implemented program of nuclear education on the facts of survival. Radioactivity is a kind of mystic subject understood by less than 0.1 percent of our population. It must be translated into the language of the layman in films, demonstrations, and test drills. The scientist with his dispassionate comprehension of the atom can scarcely begin to understand what terror the "invisible killer" holds for the nonscientist. Education is the only antidote for this new terror.

Civil defense faces a task as formidable and as important as that traditionally assigned to the Department of Defense. Fall-out makes it imperative that this nation have an effective civil defense. Unless we are prepared to meet this awesome radioactive threat, the military may well have little left to defend.

Dr. Willard Libby broke the ice in his informative speech of December 2, 1954, so far as official information about fall-out is concerned. There is reason to believe that the Atomic Energy Commission will release authentic data about radioactive effects as a basis for strengthening our national security. There is also reason to believe that these facts will confirm the conclusions presented here and that, in fact, they will, if candid, verify that the author's calculations have been conservative.

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Alaska and Hawaii

Statehood or Commonwealth Status?

by Richard Strout

GIVING statehood to Alaska or Hawaii seems to me simple folly. Statehood advocates are now presenting to Congress a bill to do just that. So the old merry-go-round starts all over again. Dozens of national organizations who haven't given the matter realistic thought, from the American Legion to the Congress of Home Missions, advocate statehood. Republicans want the pro-Republican Hawaii made a state to give them two GOP Senators and Democrats want the pro-Democratic Alaska made a state by similar reasoning, and the prospects are that rival politicians will pair off and make them both states. That will add "two stars to the Flag" which has a nice patriotic ring and appeals to sentimentalists. But why *statehood*? Puerto Rico had a chance at statehood and rejected it; she preferred to become a self-governing Commonwealth. Why not Commonwealth status for Alaska and Hawaii?

Would Great Britain make New Zealand a "state"? That is, would she put New Zealand politicians down in the House of Commons to decide matters about Limehouse and East Camberwell instead of Auckland and Wellington? New Zealand and Canada and Australia and the rest would, of course, never accede to such an arrangement if London proposed it. Why should they want an integrated relationship when Commonwealth status is so much simpler, easier and more flexible? The Commonwealths don't run England, and England doesn't run the Commonwealths; they share common citizenship, defense and foreign policy. Britain by slow evolution and comfortable periods of absent-mindedness invented this admirable relationship; the United States would throw invaluable experience away by its new proposal: dissolving non-contiguous areas, with different problems and experience, into the parent country as "states." The whole show would be run from Washington.

It was a day of parades, music and speeches in Puerto Rico in July, 1952. There were flowers and festivals, for the islanders celebrated their new constitution by which the natives were still citizens of the United States but simultaneously a self-governing Commonwealth. They had no feeling of inferiority; why should they? The Puerto Rican flag was raised beside the Stars and Stripes. They had been offered statehood but what interest did the 2 million islanders have in electing a couple of Senators to the American upper chamber in order to engage in continental politics? Opponents of statehood argued it would confer no real advantage and would create important difficulties. For example, Puerto Rican taxes which as a territory stayed in the island would as a state go to Washington. As a Commonwealth Puerto Rico wrote its own constitution, took full control of local affairs, elected its own government, ended its period as "colony" and "possession," retained unrestricted trade rights with the United States, and retained American citizenship for its nationals. Puerto Rico cannot afford the military defenses it needs, but under Commonwealth status these continue to be paid for from Washington. Defense and foreign relations are reserved to the USA. Puerto Ricans continue to serve in the US Armed Forces; federal agencies continue to provide Puerto Rico services as they did before it became a Commonwealth; any Puerto Rican who comes to the mainland and establishes residence in a state may vote as any other citizen.

What did Puerto Rico give up by not taking statehood? Well, its citizens don't vote in Presidential elections (though Republicans and Democrats permit Puerto Rico to participate in nominating conventions). Puerto Rico elects no Senators nor Representatives, but now—as before—the Island has an elected Resident Commissioner with a seat in the House. He does not vote but he may introduce bills, participate in committee discussions and speak on the floor. The islanders, lacking statehood, lose the opportunity of contributing taxes to the mainland but few islanders are so philanthropic as to count this a loss —their taxes continue to be reserved for use on the island.

This looks like a pretty cozy arrangement. And it is. It is dignified, honorable and sensible. It speaks of the limited vision and comparative inexperience of Americans, I think, that those who advocate statehood for Hawaii and Alaska, seem to feel there is no alternative to that step. It has become almost a matter of liberal dogma that the two territories must be states.

To this writer it seems unthinkable that a nation with the genius to create that amazing masterpiece of compromise, the American Constitution, should feel itself limited now by a frozen choice between statehood or territorial status. It is hard to avoid the idea that people who advocate statehood from idealistic motives haven't really thought very much about it. In an article in the December *Democratic Digest* a list appears of organizations favoring statehood for Alaska. It includes, the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Amvets, the AFL, the CIO and

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Richard Strout is Washington correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.

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Railway Brotherhoods, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, the National Grange, the Lions, Kiwanis and Moose, the Congress of Home Missions, and the Conference of Governors. It is an impressive list, and one for statehood for Hawaii would probably be bigger.

AMERICA faces an historic choice. It swept westward to the Pacific and made states of the whole territory. Now it is a compact, integrated, logical land mass. Once an overseas, non-contiguous area becomes a state the irrevocable precedent is set for all time. I may be wrong and this may be a good thing, but at least it is a solemn decision and deserves prayerful thought rather than tinkling phrases about adding a "new star to the flag."

Hawaii, as every reader of steamship literature knows, is an island paradise 2,400 miles out in the Pacific. It has a population of half a million and an area larger than Rhode Island and Connecticut combined. It was once a monarchy and then a republic, and was annexed in 1898. Its population is about 25 percent so-called white, about a third Japanese, and the remaining 40 percent is Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese and mixed. It appears to be a reasonably stable area whose common people are now emotionally roused by their colonial status and who, probably, are ready for greater self-government. No Democrat has been elected Delegate from Hawaii since 1932.

Alaska is one-fifth the size of the United States, 99 percent of it unsurveyed. Its population is 129,000, compared to 160,000 for Nevada, the smallest state. It is 60 miles from Russian Siberia and is separated from the US by 870 miles of Canadian territory. Only one-tenth of one percent of Alaska's land is privately owned; all but three-tenths is owned by the federal government. The biggest town is Anchorage with 11,254. Alaskans are said to want statehood though whether the Eskimo population would care much whether they got statehood or Commonwealth is somewhat obscure. At any rate, Alaska's white population, numbering about 57 percent (or 72,401) and rapidly growing, do want a higher status. Just why they want statehood from a financial aspect is hard to understand. Under statehood (as contrasted to Commonwealth) Alaskan taxes would be sent to Washington. The added expense might bankrupt her. In 1952 Alaska collected $15,100,000 in taxes. Under statehood she would assume expenses now borne by the federal government one estimate of which is $18 million a year. Whether Alaska could stagger along under this is not certain. Alaska is dominantly Democratic. It hasn't sent a Republican Delegate to Washington since 1932.

Should an area with 129,000 people have two men in the US Senate when that is all New York State has with a population of 14,800,000? So far I have spoken primarily from the view of the two areas themselves. But now consider the effect which statehood would have on Washington. The small population of Alaska is a difficult argument to surmount but advocates of statehood do it manfully. Take the before-mentioned issue of *Democratic Digest*, which is drooling at the thought of two more Democratic Senators. Alaska, says the article accurately, now has a bigger population than a number of states did when they were first admitted; "Oregon, for example, had 52,000, and Nevada only 27,000." But see where this argument leaves you. The population of the Canal Zone is 52,000, of Guam 59,000, of the Virgin Islands 27,000. Shall each of these be made states, and each given two Senators, because their population is now as large as Nevada when it gained statehood? If statehood goes to Hawaii and Alaska can it be denied to other non-contiguous areas, now or in the future?

The inalienable law of the Constitution gives each state two Senators. That won't be changed. As Senator Fulbright likes to point out, the Senate is the only upper legislative chamber among democracies that has gained strength in relation to the lower body. The power of two Senators from Hawaii or Alaska in domestic political matters goes without saying. These Senators would not merely cancel out an equal number of Senators from bigger states, they could go beyond that. Much of the Senate's most important work is done by two-thirds votes, as in approving a treaty or over-riding a Presidential veto. In these instances two Senators from Alaska, voting "No" and representing only 129,000 people, would neutralize the four "Yes" votes of New York and Pennsylvania, representing 25,300,000 people! That is in the order of 119 to 1. It is true that the same situation now exists with respect to Nevada, but that is no reason for going outside continental boundaries to enlarge the unequal influence. The opportunity for bargaining or blackmail—particularly in an anachronistic body without rules of cloture or germaneness—hardly needs mention.

SEATS in the House of Representatives are now allocated roughly one to each 345,000 people. Today Alaska has a non-voting Delegate who can introduce bills and speak. In a state he would have a vote. But Alaska's population falls short of the population ration minimum by about 216,000. Here again the same situation applies to Nevada. Some people who don't like Reno gambling and divorce yearn to turn Nevada back into a territory. But it is too late for that now. For Alaska, however, there is the happy alternative of giving it Commonwealth status.

It is to be hoped that the significance of that gala holiday in Puerto Rico in July, 1952, can be understood, particularly in Hawaii, where statehood has been drummed up into an emotional issue. Puerto Ricans did not choose statehood: they chose to be a dominion—like Canada. The flower-decked islanders had parades, music and oratory to celebrate their Fourth. Washington was not going to boss them—and they weren't going to try to boss Washington. They were rejoicing because they had won honorable partnership within a great democracy as a self-governing Commonwealth.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON

★

The Superficial Aspect

THERE ARE times when a superficial knowledge of history is unpleasant. For instance, when Senator Knowland and some military men call for action to eliminate the menace of Red China the student who has read Grote shudders. They sound too much like Alcibiades urging the Athenians to undertake the expedition against Syracuse.

To assuage this qualm it is useless to cite the maxim, "History never repeats," for if you do some mocking devil will instantly cite the maxim, "Like causes produce like effects." The causes of Senator Knowland's and Alcibiades' perturbation are strikingly similar, and the immediate, first effects are somewhat similar; whether the later effects will bear any resemblance to each other remains to be seen.

IN 416 B. C. Athens had Sparta pretty nearly where the United States has Germany in 1955 A. D. and the Dwight Eisenhower of the time, a General Nicias, said, "Hold it!" His idea was that Athens' great need was rest and recuperation after 15 years of war. But while Sparta was down, Syracuse, like Red China today, remained undefeated. Syracuse was on the perimeter of the Athenian sphere of influence, as China is on the perimeter of ours; but Alcibiades was as certain that the task remained unfinished while the Syracusan power remained unbroken as Senator Knowland is that we cannot rest as long as Red China stands.

The agitation of Alcibiades and his friends was so effective that in the end it drove even Nicias if not into approval, at least into a reluctant consent. That carries the modern parallel a little beyond the current date, for as these lines are written the modern Nicias has not given even a reluctant assent; but Eisenhower has advised Congress to make a menacing gesture in the direction of Red China. Two explanations of this course are possible. One, accepted by Congress, is that the gesture was necessary to ward off an impending attack; the other, admitted, of course, by nobody, is that Nicias under pressure of the agitation is beginning to take action against his better judgment.

It is the end of the ancient story that makes the student shiver. Athens learned the hard way that military power is effective in inverse ratio to the distance at which it is applied. What was overwhelming in Greece proved inadequate at the other end of a long sea-lane. The Athenian armies landed in Sicily, bogged down and were frittered away; the Athenian fleet, partly by shipwreck and partly by enemy action, was destroyed; so when a revived Sparta rose again Athens had neither land nor seapower and was crushed.

And all the while Macedon, like Soviet Russia, was looming upon the horizon, to march in when the Greek states had exhausted themselves.

The modern parallel, extrapolated, is even more sinister than the ancient, for Macedon after all was Hellenistic and her conquest of Greece did not involve a social, but only a political revolution. Alexander the Great was a pupil of Aristotle, but if Malenkov ever studied under Arnold J. Toynbee nobody has heard of it. If American armies are swallowed up in the bottomless morass of mainland China, and American fleets and the American economy are exhausted in maintaining the enormously long lines of communication, the conqueror who marches in will impose upon the Western world not merely a new form of political control, but a different and, as most of us believe, a much inferior civilization.

One hopes, of course, that the common sense of the American people will revolt before the process has been carried too far, but it must be admitted that the Athenians were one of the most intelligent populations that ever lived, yet their intelligence did not save them. They were intelligent enough to recognize and to name the threat that hung over them—they called it *hubris*, that pride of power that ruins men and nations by undermining their judgment in moments of triumph.

NOT long ago D. W. Brogan, a shrewd Scottish observer, published an essay on the Illusion of American Omnipotence, which was a flat assertion that *hubris* is infecting this nation to an alarming extent. Brogan can be wrong, but he is nobody's fool, and he didn't bring that charge without evidence to back it. Most Americans are still sane enough not to advocate imposing our rule upon the world by the power of the sword, but Senator Knowland does not hesitate to talk of using economic power for that purpose; and pride of power is still *hubris*, even when it is based on the power of the dollar.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The South Moves to the City

by Alexander Heard

THE history of the world can be traced in its towns and cities. From Memphis on the Nile, one of the earliest, to Memphis on the Mississippi, one of the most recent, the organization of society has been reflected in the number and character of its urban places. Since the time men first achieved a measure of freedom from the soil, and began to move surplus products by wheel and sail, towns have been the principal focal points for the developing specializations of society. They have grown in response to the needs of commerce, industry, finance, education, government, recreation, health care, religion, and more besides.

The Urban South; edited by Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath with the assistance of Sara Smith and Elizabeth M. Fink (North Carolina; $5).

But towns and cities are not merely passive products of their times. As clusters of interdependent people living in close proximity, they create impelling forces of their own that mold the values and abilities of those who live within them, and sometimes of those who live outside as well. When steam power superseded the power of wind and water in eighteenth-century England, the division of labor and factory system that resulted brought enormous changes in the size and living conditions of cities. As a consequence of these changes, the submerged proletariat and burgeoning middle class sought means of political power that led ultimately to parliamentary reforms, universal suffrage, and the modern political party system.

The development of the United States can be interpreted, too, in the changing distribution of its people between rural and urban places and in the ways of living the changes signify. In 1790 there were 24 urban centers—places with 2500 or more inhabitants—holding five percent of the nation's population. In 1950 the number of urban centers was 4,284, holding 59 percent of the people. The South has always been the most clearly identified geographical section in the country, and one of the firmest indexes of difference between it and the rest of the nation has been the degree of urbanization. In 1790 the South was approximately one-third as urbanized as the whole country and in 1900 it was only slightly more so. Later however, the rate of urbanization in the South began to increase more rapidly than in the whole nation, so that by 1950, when 43 percent of the population in thirteen Southern states lived in urban areas, it was approximately three-fourths as urbanized as the nation. In short, the South has been getting more like the rest of the country, and here comes a book about it.

The Urban South is published by the University of North Carolina Press for the Institute for Research in Social Science of that University, where the two editors teach. It is a product, however, of regional co-operation in scholarship, with nineteen contributors from twelve institutions in eight states. The participants—who include some of the South's most prominent social scientists—are largely sociologists, although three political scientists, one city planner and one economist are along.

THE volume brings together fourteen timely articles that range across the whole subject of Southern urbanism. Although parts of some have appeared in print before, they were all prepared especially for this symposium. Without exception, the contributions are clearly written and neatly organized, no doubt testifying to the diligence of the editors as well as to the skill of the authors. All the contributions will be of interest and of use to anyone concerned with the South or with one of the cardinal features of the contemporary world, urbanism.

The book opens with a history of urbanization in the South—the emergence of Southern cities and certain factors affecting their growth, particularly migration, fertility and employment opportunities. This is followed by discussion of some contemporary "organizational aspects" of Southern cities—the dominance of metropolitan areas and their relationship to the surrounding hinterland; the physical arrangements and related social order within cities, called the ecological structure; social classes; and the incidence and conditions of crime. The conclusion of the book concerns urbanism and the future, especially with respect to race relations, politics, and the changing values of the rural village. Two mechanisms of social adaption and change are also assessed: city planning and community councils.

URBANISM is a state of society. In the twentieth century South its increase, both in absolute numbers of residents and in comparison with rural areas, testifies to many things, including the mechanization and diversification of agriculture, increased employment in industrial, service and distributive occupations, the development of communications, transportation, and financial facilities, the increasing diffusion of urban ways in all parts of the region, and most of all to the movement of the South toward a general "convergence" with the rest of the nation. A counterpart of this urbanization process has been the growth of the "rural non-farm" population. In 1950, approximately one-half of the rural population of the South (the non-urban population) was classed as non-farm.

That the increasing urbanization of the South has political consequences is beyond doubt. Perhaps one of the clearest signs appears in the tenacity with which the rural-dominated state legislatures refuse to grant the occupants of urban areas equal representation in their own houses and in the United States House of Representatives. There is evidence that voting participation under certain conditions increases with urbanization. Differences show up in the voting records of Southern rural and urban Congressmen. The latter, according to the measures set down by the editors of the *New Republic*, are somewhat more liberal.

Moreover, the social organization of urban areas has profound long-run political consequences. The political splits within the increasingly prosperous white middle classes are still to be adequately explored, but it seems clear that the ef-

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fects of the large migrations of Negroes to Southern (as well as Northern) cities have a direct impact on the foundations of Southern politics. The diversified economic opportunities open to Negroes in the cities modify the former personal relationships that existed between them and their white neighbors. Urban climates afford greater tolerance of collective action undertaken by Negroes (and whites) against various types of discrimination. In the presence of these two conditions, modifications have occurred in the traditional patterns of belief and behavior. Negro voting is on the increase, and so is the solicitude of politicians for Negro votes. This kind of product of Southern urbanization has chain effects that have already in some places affected importantly the factional competition within the primaries of the Democratic party, and even seem to be significant to the balance of strength between the two parties.

The characteristics, causes and consequences of Southern urbanization reach far beyond these matters, however, as this excellent book makes clear. They are multiple, interrelated and complex. But one conclusion of first importance to all citizens of the United States emerges: for better or worse the South is losing some of the distinctive, traditional qualities that have set it apart. It is becoming more like the rest of the nation.

The Truth and the Vacuum

by Dachine Rainer

I HAD dared hope after reading Eudora Welty's *The Ponder Heart* that the Cult of Experience in American fiction had been reduced to its ultimate absurdity and that the only way we could go from here was up. I was wrong. We have had so much writing now about people whose abject lives can be cause for a passing regret rather than for any literary concern, that it comes almost as a surprise to discover that it is possible to write of these people without even attempting to involve them in any experience at all. This is Cult of Experience writing from which all experience has been removed.

The Simple Truth, by Elizabeth Hardwick (Harcourt, Brace; $3.50).

In Elizabeth Hardwick's second novel, *The Simple Truth,* the two characters, one a graduate student, the other a professor's wife, both prodigiously dissatisfied with their lives, become partisan spectators at the trial of a university student, a stranger to them both, who has been accused of strangling his sweetheart. The trial becomes their sole preoccupation. Joseph Parks, the graduate student, sees the trial as an example of flagrant class injustice: the poor boy in love with the rich girl is driven to kill her by her parents' opposition to their relationship. (Is the new crop of American liberals really so simple-minded?) Anita Mitchell, the professor's wife, who feels she is "different," and who, one presumes, is meant to represent the artistic personality, believes that the sensitive approach necessitated by the complex, extenuating circumstances cannot be perceived by ordinary people, that is, by the jury. Both characters are most disconcerted when the boy is acquitted. Where is the biased class justice? Parks wonders. And Anita Mitchell has the sense of her own uniqueness disturbed; the jury obviously saw the subtleties too.

This novel would have made a passable anecdote at a faculty lunch. It is the typically academic comment on two stock figures: the self-deceiving American liberal and the professor's "creative" wife, who has no particular outlet for her amorphous talents.

I can't go on believing that a work of fiction has validity only because it is convincingly dreary. That's all right for "life," where people are dull and apathetic, and where the imagination is thwarted and the spirit depressed. In art one expects a little liveliness, a little enthusiasm, and no matter how oblique and halfhearted, the novelist is under an obligation to select and postulate certain positive values. Obviously, I don't mean anything Victorian, nothing upward and onward, but we must be convinced in times like these that there is an area in the imagination of man, where a meaningful, attractive, livable world is valid. Perhaps it is a world just outside the realm of the work at hand, but we must know it exists. For this, the novelist must be emotionally involved. It is insufficient that the writer has the ability to analyze her characters away to nothingness—that she can sit in the vast Sahara of their lives and scrutinize the drying skin, the wasting minds and bodies, and, finally, their whitened, brittle bones. The novelist must love them, hate them, care about them in some way. They must matter. Writing that captures the heart and mind has a tremendous urgency about it.

Miss Hardwick's first novel, *The Ghostly Lover* was autobiographical; what it really was was the viscera of a novel without any of the muscular coverings that both modesty and a sense of responsibility towards one's craft demands. Like this work, it had no heart no circulatory system, no respiratory tract—above all, no heart.

If *The Simple Truth* is a *tour de force,* and the blurb on the jacket informs me that it is—(indeed, I can't imagine what else it could be)—it is surely the most pallid one ever perpetrated. The style is so portentous that one expects up to the last paragraph that something of moment is about to be revealed, and one comes away from *The Simple Truth* both disconcerted by the very real vacuity of the people, and bewildered that the novelist can work up sufficient interest in them to record their meagre speculations and their minor and pathetic self-deceptions.

MISS HARDWICK has a certain skill. That she managed to keep this reader with her for 200 pages during which little of interest was said, and nothing at all was done, is adequate testimony to that. She has charm, wit and intelligence. Her description of Iowa, its permanent inmates and its transients is amusingly devastating:

> Here also at the University were many teachers from Europe, from Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and Madrid, remarkable souls pacing the Iowa pavements, carrying in their pockets a month old copy of *Figaro Littéraire.* They were in America, no doubt about that, even if perhaps they had not bargained for so completely the real thing and wondered at their fate.

But it is all of a piece—the depressing squalor of the American mind. Could Miss Hardwick, one wonders, de-

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scribe the Garden of Eden, or would she give merely a minute account of the worm that invades the golden apple? Many years ago, Corey Ford, in a satire on this school, had one of his characters break his arm at the elbow just to hear it crack. I think this sort of thing has gone on long enough. We have in *The Simple Truth* what Eliot forecast in "The Hollow Men," but Miss Hardwick's world ends not with a whimper, but with a yawn.

Public Understanding and Foreign Policy

by Michael Straight

ONE in ten Americans perhaps can point to Quemoy on a world Atlas. The other nine, nonetheless, will insist on directing the course of American conduct there. And naturally: for what happens in Quemoy vitally affects their fortunes and their lives. But, if foreign policy is thus brought into the parlor its intricacies are not thereby reduced.

Among the tasks we face as a world leader the reconciliation of the complexities of foreign affairs and the simplicities of democracy is the most challenging. George Kennan has warned that diplomacy and democracy may be irreconcilable. Charles Burton Marshall has cited public opinion as a major limiting factor in foreign policy. Walter Lippmann, in his forthcoming book *The Public Philosophy* returns again to his preoccupation with the dangerous and possibly fatal rigidities caused by legislatures in their excursions into foreign policy in the name of the public will.

Common Sense and World Affairs, by Dorothy Fosdick (Harcourt, Brace; $3.50).

Dorothy Fosdick, a former associate of Kennan and Marshall on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, approaches the challenge in a somewhat more hopeful and positive spirit. She takes it for granted that Americans will insist on shaping the broad outlines of their government's foreign policy. She has in mind, although she does not develop at length, what the constructive relationship of the the voter and the responsible expert must be. "Every man among us," said Pericles, "is if not an initiator, at least a judge of policy." Miss Fosdick proceeds from the Periclean view. The initiation and execution of foreign policy, she believes, must be held in expert hands and the public must come to respect once more the diplomat's special competence. The people must guide the general principles of policy, rejecting or endorsing the proposals that the government brings forth.

"Principles," Miss Fosdick believes, "tell us how to feel, how not to act, and what to look for." Her book consists of twelve guiding principles by which Americans can judge their government's policy. They are all sound principles, of moderation, of patience, of modesty and respect for the view of allies. Not all are equal in importance, and some might be contradictory. The examples cited as illustration are not limited to the principles cited, and in some cases, such as the need for a new German policy or the relationship of Communism to poverty, germs of ideas are thrust forward in discussion too brief to do more than encourage further thought. Many more principles of equal validity could be added to Miss Fosdick's list. But anyone who reads her book and reflects upon it will possess the wisdom needed for good citizenship.

Miss Fosdick's book is written for the League of Women Voters audience. And every office seeker will affirm that the League is a formidable force. Her objective is sound and yet an uncomfortable gap still remains between the "seasoned statesman" and the "seasoned citizen" that she looks for, and one which must be filled.

First, as Miss Fosdick notes, her principles are substantially negative and tell us what we must not do. But there is a crying need today to be told what we can and must do in the way of affirmative action overseas. For this Miss Fosdick looks to government. In present hands? The initiation of great ideas like European federation and world control of nuclear weapons cannot be entrusted to government alone. It requires political leadership outside of government. For quite apart from the mental inertia of those now in power the task of the foreign service is to administer the *status quo* rather than to bring about the tremendous changes required for world stability and world peace. The Democratic Party today should at least consider the great alternatives in the Pacific. It abrogated its responsibility in signing a blank check over to President Eisenhower and so left between citizens and government a huge empty space.

Second, insight and foresight require a body of experts outside of government who can gather and interpret intelligence and then speak out. In Formosa, for example, the crux of our policy is our appraisal of Communist China's mood and intentions. Both the experts of the State Department and of the United Nations guessed wrong on the cease-fire. Nehru and Attlee more nearly gauged Peiping's reaction. The reason perhaps, is that they are in contact with Peiping. We are not. And for as long as we lack contact and knowledge, principles cannot suffice. The appalling fact is that familiarity with and knowledge of Communism is in itself suspect. Our old China hands are losing touch and dying. And we are not replacing them. There are 382,000 barbers, beauticians and manicurists in the United States today. But among our 160 million citizens there are barely a half dozen young experts on the world's most populous nation, or a score of young scholars who are learning Chinese. There is no place for them in our universities, and to Congress, scholarship on China smacks of the dread initials: IPR.

Tickle of Labor Day

IT WAS a pink dust slack shack town
With beer in coils and rattling canes
Of poles of sunlight on Main Street,
A single three o'clock train town where,
With a catfish woodcut over the door
The bait place slept and the rickety wood
Of its piles walked over a bluish mud,
Where the fish learned early in July
To cool with their shadows overgoing
Ooze beyond outboard reach, and oar.
We'll go again there, bye and bye.

REUEL DENNEY

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FILMS

MAN, as almost everyone knows, is the only movie-making animal. For that matter, the motion picture is in some respects the most precious of the gifts evolution has dropped into our laps, being the chief distinguishing feature between us and the lower orders of creation. Unless you count the opposable thumb. And, just as the thumb evolved in response to man's need to tie his shoelaces, so the motion pictures are evolution's answer to a challenge.

The challenge was first clearly stated by Henry David Thoreau, who said, "All men lead lives of quiet desperation."

Nothing happened immediately after this. Evolution, like a cross-town bus, is long in coming but it does arrive in its own good time. And so eventually there appeared a contrivance with which men could supplement their lives of quiet desperation with lives of noisy desperadoes.

In all fairness, it must be admitted that Hollywood has remained loyal to its origins, rebuffing critics of genuine drama. The industry knows that its clientele wants not drama, not even entertainment, but brainwashing. Accordingly, each week, millions of quietly desperate people pay millions of dollars for a couple of hours of preoccupation that leaves their mental slates as blank as the day they were born. An excellent arrangement, all in all.

Unfortunately, something that has evolved for one purpose may be made to serve another. Even the amiable thumb, which came into being to tie shoelaces, finds itself pressed against urchin noses to make gestures at policemen, or used to match pennies in gambling hells. The motion picture industry developed the wide screen, a dirty trick to play on an audience in wild pursuit of the *tabula rasa*.

My own first acquaintance with the wide screen was under somewhat peculiar circumstances. I had broken my glasses and, being extremely nearsighted, concluded that if I were to see anything at all it would have to be something of considerable dimensions. Hence, Cinemascope.

The program started with a selected short subject, shown on the regular screen to prepare us for the contrast. By squinting I was able to make out a boat bobbing up and down on the water, and deduced that it was another Deep-Sea-Fishing - Off - The - Coast - Of - Florida shorts. Having made the recognition I could ignore the fuzzy doings on the screen, knowing that if you have slept through one you've slept through the lot.

The narrator's words were sufficient clues: "He's hooked and the battle is on . . . " which meant that on the screen there was a large fish flapping about the ocean with forced heartiness. ". . . Pound for pound this blue whale is the gamest, fighting-est fish ever to challenge the skill of Jim Borlicks, prominent Houston sportsman . . . " which meant that the victorious fisherman had finally succeeded in pulling over the rail a distinctly uninteresting fish of some sort.

And then, with a blast of trumpets from all directions and an ever-widening of the curtains, Cinemascope burst upon us. I saw a splendid panorama of mountains and valleys, in colors so vibrant as to suggest Hollywood was attempting to hold, as it were, a Miro up to Nature. The sound track, however, seemed determined to lead an independent existence, carrying on a spirited dialogue with no one in sight to speak it.

It wasn't until one of the mountans began to move that I got my proper bearings. Although it wasn't my faith that got them in motion, it took every scrap of that commodity I could summon to persuade myself that those hulking monoliths were intended to represent people.

Subsequent trips to Cinemascopic productions in the company of a new pair of glasses have slightly altered my perspectives, but the impression of mountainous bulk has remained and I have begun to entertain serious doubts about the advantages of the wide screen. As far as I can see, the only significant result of this attempt to pile Pelion on Ossa (or, if you prefer, Beverly Hills on Mount Kilimanjaro) has been to make mediocrity, formerly a pleasant adjunct of brainwashing, into an obtrusive horror. Previously, I had rather enjoyed the run-of-DeMille religious movie with its false piety. But on the wide screen, the falseness of the piety as well as Victor Mature's profile, has been painfully enlarged, destroying the amusement value of both.

Nevertheless, advocates of the wide screen claim that it is revolutionizing the industry, and it is. It should be particularly revolutionary with respect to the code of morals that governs the movies. Romantic close-ups, for one thing, will have to be drastically altered. At present on the Cinemascope screen, the clinch is arranged in much the same way as on the old narrow screens; that is, we see two heads, one of each sex, in enlarged conjunction. But on the wide screen the two heads, big as they are, seem insignificant in comparison to the acres of distracting scenery stretching on either side. Sooner or later it is bound to occur to a director that the only logical way to perform love scenes on the wide screen is *horizontally*. The consequences of this are awesome to contemplate.

But something of the sort will have to happen soon to revive my waning enthusiasm for the wide screen. The current sagas of the barbarian hordes are presenting me with the same difficulty I experience at football games, where I always seem to watch the wily gentleman who only *pretends* he's got the ball. I find myself watching the extra who is scratching himself surreptitiously under his toga when I am supposed to be attending to the swordplay of Attila the Hun.

Lately I have taken to sitting in the farthest row of the topmost balcony, whence I survey the panorama through fieldglasses, which helps some. But I suppose the only permanent solution will be to televise these extravaganzas, as football games are televised, with trained camera crews focusing on the significant action. This, I am sure, would be a workable scheme, but would it not inevitably raise embarrassing questions about the necessity of Cinemascope?

In any case, the motion picture industry, evolution's latest masterwork, might profit by the example of the dinosaurs, who became extinct simply because they wouldn't or couldn't stop growing.

DONALD MALCOLM

Notes on the Critics

ALEXANDER HEARD, professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina, is the author of *A Two-Party South?* DACHINE RAINER is a free lance writer and critic. DONALD MALCOLM writes from the University of Michigan.

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A Communication

Since publication in the *New Republic* of "New Light on the Lattimore Case," Federal District Judge Luther W. Youngdahl for a second time dismissed as "formless and obscure" the "key" counts of the government's perjury indictment of Lattimore. The Justice Department will appeal Youngdahl's decision. The following protest against *NR*'s article was prepared by Sol Stein, Executive Director of the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, after consultation with members of his Exectuive Committee. The author's reply is also printed.

SIRS:

OWEN LATTIMORE is under indictment for perjury. The remarks that follow, however, are not concerned with Professor Lattimore's *legal* guilt or innocence in that action, or even with the propriety of the indictment. Rather they constitute a critique of an article entitled "New Light on the Lattimore Case," which appeared in the *New Republic* (December 27, 1954) under the authorship of one "Brian Gilbert," who prefers to conceal his identity by the use of a pseudonym. It is my contention that Mr. Gilbert has misinterpreted existing evidence and has, in fact, actually ignored new evidence that is now available. If Mr. Gilbert's article expressed his displeasure with the perjury case now pending against Owen Lattimore, readers may question the propriety of such interference with the judicial process and the appropriateness of such pressures upon a judge and jurors who will have to maintain objectivity in weighing the answers.

For instance, early in the article the author points out that, at the McCarran Committee hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations:

> Accusing witnesses were encouraged to plumb deep into their memories, knowing that any recollection would be rewarded and, there being no cross-examination, that inaccuracy would bring no retribution. If they contradicted earlier statements made to the Tydings Committee, these small lapses would be overlooked. Take, for example, the testimony of witness Louis Budenz. . . .

Budenz's testimony before the McCarran Committee is described by the *New Republic* author as "new memories," but if one refers to the text of the Tydings hearings, one learns that Mr. Budenz had in fact testified at these earlier hearings that

> . . . Among the cells organized there was a cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations. . . . The cell was Communist, but the Institute of Pacific Relations was not a Communist organization. . . . In this cell there was also Owen Lattimore. This I know from reports received in the Politburo, and given to me officially as managing editor of the *Daily Worker.—Tydings Committee hearings, Part I, pp. 490-1.*

Mr. Gilbert, nevertheless, reports without dissent the Tydings Committee conclusion that the whole thesis of Lattimore's having been a Soviet apologist was "a fraud and a hoax." The McCarran Committee, on the other hand, concluded that Lattimore "was from some time in the 1930's a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy." Which committee is one to believe? It is difficult to see how anyone *who has read the record of both hearings* can seriously question the legitimacy of the McCarran statement. Moreover, as McCarthy's opponents, James Rorty and Moshe Decter concluded in their book, *McCarthy and the Communists*:

> If the Tydings Committee had chosen to discharge its mandate, it could have picked up the broad and trampled trail of Communist infiltration that led from the hastily briefed Amerasia case to the Institute of Pacific Relations. And if it had picked up this trail, it might well have reached in 1950 the conclusions affirmed by the McCarran Committee two years later.

Further on in his article, Mr. Gilbert notes that during the McCarran hearings, "Lattimore came to the witness stand indignant and truculent. He had been defending himself for a decade. . . ." Unsubstantiated, this reference can only serve to picture Lattimore as a perpetually harassed individual who had for ten years been subject to Congressional or other investigations based on charges that could not be proven. Can Mr. Gilbert give his readers some instances of persecution suffered by Mr. Lattimore during the eight-year period prior to 1950? After all, it was Lattimore himself who testified "in the pre-McCarthy days, I used to think that life was lots of fun." That hardly sounds like the complaint of a man who had been persecuted for eight years prior to making the statement.

Somewhere in his article, Mr. Gilbert broadens his field to inform us of his displeasure with the whole realm of Congressional inquiry into Communist influence:

> Thus the Congressional investigation, traditionally limited to seeking facts on which to base legislation and checking the performance by the executive of duties imposed by statutes, is made to function very much like a Grand Jury. First the Chairman has a hunch; at some stage in the proceedings, perhaps even before the hearings are begun, he finds the defendant guilty. The Committee then obtains a public "conviction" by purposeful publicity. And for such a prosecuting committee, perjury becomes an objective.

It is difficult to know why Mr. Gilbert believes he makes a telling point against Congressional committees by comparing them to a Grand Jury. The Grand Jury has long been regarded as a cornerstone of liberty, and is expressly provided for by our Bill of Rights. A legal institution usually the object of liberal praise, it is here put in a pejorative light, or at least a Congressional committee is put in a bad light because it is said to behave like a Grand Jury. In fact, Congressional investigating committees do not have a strictly judicial function. They seek to establish facts pertinent to the subject of their inquiry. Questioning of witnesses is a proper means toward this end. (In the case of the IPR hearings, numerous witnesses appeared in support of Mr. Lattimore—an advantage not granted by a Grand Jury, which determines whether an indictment should be handed down on the basis of *partial* evidence.) The FBI, to whom some persons would like to entrust *all* responsibility for counter-espionage, can only amass information, but it is not called upon to *evaluate* such information. Congressional committees, however, when they function responsibly, perform a valuable service in furnishing the public with evaluated information concerning the work of apologists and agents of the Soviet Union who have not—or cannot be proven to have—broken existing laws.

Mr. Gilbert accuses the McCarran Committee of having functioned "like a Grand Jury" which set to work after "the Chairman has a hunch. . . ." Sure-

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ly the heaps of evidence available *before* the McCarran Committee hearings began constitute a basis for more than a mere "hunch." Mr. Gilbert then contends that "at some stage of the proceedings, perhaps even before the hearings are begun, he [McCarran] finds the defendant guilty." Are we to believe that Mr. Gilbert could read what was in Senator McCarran's mind before the hearings began? Is it not therefore fair to conclude that, at some point in the hearings, spectators and Chairman McCarran alike had been exposed to sufficient evidence to become persuaded that Owen Lattimore had been more than a purveyor of Orientalia? After all, it was on the first day of public testimony (July 25, 1951) of the IPR hearings that a letter to IPR General Secretary Edward C. Carter was introduced into the record, addressed to him by Owen Lattimore and dated July 10, 1938, which said in part:

> I think you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. [Asiaticus and Chi have been identified as Communists; Chen Han-seng has been identified under oath as closely associated with the Chinese Communists.] They will bring out the essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch.
>
> . . . For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Chinese Communist position—far enough not to be covered by the same label—but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. . . . For the USSR—back their international policy in general, but without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience. . . .

Mr. Gilbert wonders out loud about the propriety of Senator McCarran's being influenced by such evidence!

Gilbert goes on to mention the Committee's seeking "purposeful publicity," by which he must have meant that newspapermen and the public, presumably including himself, were permitted to be present. Woe to Senator McCarran had he *prevented* newspapermen or the public from attending the hearings!

But by this time, Gilbert has transformed the Grand Jury into a "Prosecuting Committee" which seeks "not facts, but perjury, not truth but falsehood." What Mr. Gilbert is saying is that the McCarran Committee was trying to find discrepancies in testimony in order to arrive at the truth, a perfectly legitimate procedure which is transformed by Mr. Gilbert's terminology into a deceitful—and unethical—one. Is Mr. Gilbert implying that the McCarran Committee suborned perjury, when in fact it was trying to determine whether the persons testifying had perjured *themselves*?

Mr. Gilbert goes on to say:

> Here is the crux of the perjury charge: what did Owen Lattimore "mean"? A statement may be false, and still not be perjury. The speaker must know it is false when he makes it. Again, what did Owen Lattimore mean? Are the words he spoke susceptible of precise definition? Could a jury conclude from factual evidence whether Lattimore meant to use them falsely?

Perhaps the reader should judge, just as a juror might. It was Lattimore who said, "I have in fact been falsely identified as a fellow-traveler, sympathizer, or follower of the Communist line or promoter of Communist interests." Yet we have already read a letter introduced on the first day of public testimony which can be interpreted as Lattimore's brief on behalf of following the line of the Communist movement—at a sufficiently discreet distance to prevent detection of his (and the IPR's) subservience to Soviet purposes.

Mr. Gilbert may be entirely right when he describes Lattimore's influence as "a purely ideological crime." If in saying this, Gilbert wants to imply that it was *merely* an "ideological crime" and that the legal indictment brought against Lattimore was a mistake, that is his privilege. But no matter what the decision of the court will be, a verdict of "guilty" by the standards of the criminal code is not a prerequisite to the conclusion that Professor Lattimore was indeed a "conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy," as was determined by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. And if that judgment can be made on the basis of the evidence provided by the McCarran hearings, then it was certainly worth the cost to the American taxpayer—as a lesson in public education on channels of Communist influence more subtle than the acts of "overt espionage" that Mr. Gilbert is looking for. To be sure, the McCarran hearings may have been a failure in that they failed to impress at least one supposed student of the testimony, namely Mr. Gilbert. Because Mr. Gilbert's scholarship is not precise, it may seem to have the effect of absolving from the charge of having Communist sympathies a man who, after the Commission of Inquiry headed by John Dewey reported that the Moscow trials were frame-ups, spoke of the Soviet purges then in progress (1938) as a triumph for democracy;* a man who agreed with the director of the Soviet Council of the IPR, Motiliev, that *Pacific Affairs,* the journal Lattimore edited, "ought to find more suitable subjects for publication than anti-Soviet articles," and who took pains to edit Soviet-sponsored articles for that magazine to make them less obvious as Communist propaganda. (Letter from Lattimore to Motiliev, February 8, 1938, IPR hearings, p. 3454; Minutes of Meeting, April 12, 1936, Moscow, attended *inter alia* by Lattimore and Motiliev, IPR hearings, p. 3172.)

Brian Gilbert's article suffers not only from its lack of relation to the facts brought out at the McCarran hearings but also, despite the optimistic title, fails completely to shed any new light on the Lattimore controversy. The important point is that there *has* been some new light on the Lattimore case since the conclusion of the IPR hearings but none of it is reflected in Mr. Gilbert's treatise on behalf of Lattimore.

During the course of the hearings, Professor Lattimore admitted that on one occasion in 1945 he had had a guest in his house for two or three hours, a Russian by the name of G. G. Dolbin.

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* "The real point, of course, for those who live in democratic countries, is whether the discovery of the conspiracy was a triumph for democracy or not. I think that this can easily be determined. The accounts of the most widely read Moscow correspondents all emphasize that since the close scrutiny of every person in a responsible position, following the trials, a great many abuses have been discovered *and rectified.* A lot depends on whether you emphasize the discovery of the abuse or the rectification of it; but habitual rectification can hardly do anything but give the ordinary citizen more courage to protest, loudly; whenever in future he finds himself being victimized by 'someone in the Party' or 'someone in the Government.' That sounds to me like democracy."—Owen Lattimore, *Pacific Affairs,* Vol. IX, No. 3, September, 1938, pp. 370-2.

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Such a meeting, in itself, might not warrant our interest, if an MVD man by the name of Rastovorov had not defected to the West subsequent to the hearings and said that Dolbin, the only Russian official Lattimore says he had ever invited to his house *"had actually served as a Soviet intelligence agent at* [the Soviet] *embassy in Washington."* (*Life*, November 29, 1954, p. 180.) Here indeed is new light on *l'affaire* Lattimore!

Then there is the incident concerning Vladmir Rogov, about whose visit to Washington in 1944 IPR General Secretary Edward Carter testified:

> I thought it was a useful opportunity for people to meet a Russian who spoke good English and who knew China thoroughly well, and who had a sense of humor and could crack little jokes in the American vernacular.

Mr. Carter sent telegrams to Alger Hiss and Lauchlin Currie, suggesting a get-together with Rogov. Owen Lattimore, among others, had a two-and-a-half-hour luncheon at the Cosmos Club in Washington with Rogov, who was ostensibly a harmless *Tass* correspondent, but who, it has since been learned, was in fact—shortly after his meeting with ideologist Lattimore if not at that time—the head of Far Eastern Intelligence for the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most glaring new light on the Lattimore affair was cast shortly before Christmas 1953. According to Henry Wallace's book *Soviet Asia Mission*, in 1945, one Sergei Arsenvich Goglidze had proposed what Wallace called a "significant toast." Goglidze had said: *"Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility for China's future."* One might call that a strong endorsement. That it was likely to have been a knowing endorsement, made by someone sufficiently high up in the conspiracy to have a knowledgeable basis for the toast, was only ascertained with its full impact eight years later when Beria, head of the Soviet MVD was executed. Killed along with him were a few of his trusted comrades. One of them was Sergei Arsenvich Goglidze, who had so positively assessed Lattimore's role in influencing the dramatic development in post-war China.

The new light that has been shed on Lattimore would seem to a student of either politics or morality to corroborate the opinion of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee that Lattimore was indeed "a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy against the free world." This conspiracy triumphed in China, yet Lattimore, its "articulate instrument," is now defended in the pages of the *New Republic* which once, on July 14, 1952, itself said:

> The [McCarran] report will, we believe, substantiate these charges: that a Communist Party caucus infiltrated the staff and council of the American IPR before the last war; that IPR officials knew of this infiltration and tolerated it; and that the IPR gave up its objective research function and adopted the role of advocate in China policy. The record will further indicate that Owen Lattimore knowingly accepted these trends and that he erred in professing naïveté or ignorance before the Committee.

SOL STEIN

. . . Mr. Gilbert replies

SIRS:

WELL, MR. STEIN has certainly wasted no time in missing the point. My article was about the impropriety of the indictment of Owen Lattimore. Mr. Stein begins by saying that his remarks do not concern this matter. He then presents what he chooses to characterize as a "critique" of my article.

Mr. Stein speaks in the name of "freedom." It's a strange kind of freedom indeed. For first he questions the "propriety" of my "interference with the judicial process." He is talking nonsense as any lawyer knows. *Amici Curiae* and public discussion of laws and law enforcement are necessary corrections to the misuse of the prosecutor's powers. And Mr. Stein himself has no hesitation in affirming Lattimore's guilt although the trial has not yet begun.

Next as to Mr. Budenz. My concern is not with Budenz's veracity, but with pointing out the difference between the McCarran Committee's treatment of Budenz and of Lattimore. As for Budenz's "new memories" before the McCarran Committee, this is what I said in my original article:

> While he [Budenz] never claimed any personal knowledge that Lattimore was working with the Communists, he told the McCarran Committee of five or six occasions on which, he said, other persons indicated to him such a connection. But these appeared to be new memories—Budenz never reported Lattimore to the FBI; he did not include Lattimore among the many he denounced in a 1949 *Collier's* article for sabotaging our China policy; the manuscript of Budenz's book on the China situation carried no mention of Lattimore though "a passing mention" was inserted after Senator McCarthy attacked Lattimore in May, 1950; before the Tydings Committee Budenz swore that he had "never seen any vestige of his [Lattimore's] Communist Party membership"; and when Budenz conferred with an editor about his *Collier's* piece, he said that he was not saying Lattimore "acted as a Communist agent in any way."
>
> When the Tydings Committee tried to force Budenz to enumerate his personal knowledge of Lattimore's activities, his answers were so vague they led Sen. Theodore Green (D, R.I.) to this conclusion:
>
> "Then, you say you have never seen him, never talked with him, never had any communication with him. You have read none of his books to speak of, none of his articles to speak of."

Mr. Stein passes next to a commercial for a book written under the auspices of his committee. It was reviewed once (and favorably) in the *New Republic* and needs no further plugging. I point out merely that it is now the subject of a possible libel suit by attorneys for Mr. Lattimore.

Both Mr. Stein and Mr. Lattimore (I'm told) are indignant about my reference to Lattimore's demeanor on the witness stand. Passing over the implications of the association, may I note Mr. Stein's use of a verbal trick frowned upon by high school debating coaches. First he quotes my reference to Lattimore "defending himself." Next he translates "defense" as "harassed." Then he translates "harassed" as "persecuted." And so at last he challenges me to give the readers some evidence to back up my charge of persecution"! I hate to haul Mr. Stein back to earth but in reference to my own word "defense" the many instances of attack are cited in my article which sometime Mr. Stein should read with care.

Next we come to "pejorative"—a succulent term. I'm sure Mr. Stein is grateful for it. He accuses me of offending liberal tradition by placing grand juries in an ugly light. If saying that an ancient and useful device differs from a new and, occasionally, abused one, is to insult the former, then I gasp and plead guilty.

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Throughout Mr. Stein's letter runs a note of endorsement of the McCarran Committee. "Numerous witnesses," he holds, appeared on Mr. Lattimore's behalf during McCarran's investigation. I'll bet he can't name one. But I can name many witnesses whose offers to provide relevant testimony were refused by the Committee. Mr. Stein asks next if I can read Senator McCarran's mind to find there a bias against Lattimore. I didn't have to, because McCarran made his feelings clear in his opening statement in which he pinned the Communist label on Lattimore before a word of Lattimore's testimony had been taken. Mr. Stein, however, indulges in clairvoyance when he claims that McCarran was seeking "the truth" in holding Lattimore on the stand for twelve days. McCarran at the time had an actual barnful of information on the subject under investigation—far more than Mr. Lattimore possessed. His investigators, working in relays, were attempting, as I wrote, to trip up Lattimore on small events that took place ten years before. Their object was not to find truth but to cause perjury.

Mr. Stein asks incredulously if I wish to infer that the McCarran Committee suborned perjury. I refer Mr. Stein to Mr. Harvey Matusow.

Lastly Mr. Stein lays before us what he calls *real* "new light" on what he calls *"L'affaire* Lattimore." (This isn't a nice little *"affaire"* Mr. Stein; it's a law suit brought by the government of the United States and bearing the weight of heavy Constitutional questions.) But Mr. Stein's "new light" is neither new nor bright.

The visit of Dolbin and that luncheon with Rogov were thoroughly discussed during the hearings. The Goglidze toast was likewise introduced. Mr. Stein's "new light" is the identification of these Soviet officials as intelligence agents. If Mr. Stein is implying that Mr. Lattimore met with these men in their capacity of intelligence agents then he should say so. The fact that Goglidze was liquidated with Beria is no shocker; who does Mr. Stein think Goglidze was, a Trotskyite? Or maybe an Oklahoma Republican? What is so surprising about their turning over information to their bosses? And whoever heard of a "harmless *Tass* correspondent"?

I neither defended nor criticized Mr. Lattimore in my article. As one who would protest the lynching of any man, innocent or guilty, I concerned myself with the dangerous precedents and procedures adopted in this case. But Mr. Stein, speaking in the name of "Freedom," would have me keep silent because by protesting the procedures I "may seem to have the effect of absolving from the charge of having Communist sympathies" Mr. Lattimore. By precisely the same argument I must not criticize some of the procedures of the Smith Act for fear of seeming to absolve the Communist Party. Nor must I criticize the methods of Senator McCarthy in roughing up witnesses who cite the Constitutional privilege for that will most certainly seem to some "to have the effect" of absolving the witnesses involved.

Mr. Stein declares further that Congressional Committees "perform a valuable service in furnishing the public with evaluated information concerning the work of apologists of the Soviet Union . . . who have not—or cannot be proven to have broken existing laws." This thought struck me as familiar. I then remembered a similar-sounding statement by a Senator quoted in my article. The Senator said of men like Lattimore: "If we cannot convict some of them for their disloyal activities perhaps we can convict some of them for perjury." The Senator of course was Joseph McCarthy. The word "apologist" is so conveniently elastic. In fact, it strikes me as almost elastic enough to include Mr. Stein, who dismisses as irrelevant or improper my concern for our Constitutional protection of any defendant, thus echoing the Communist view that the lack of these devices in Soviet jurisprudence is unimportant.

If Mr. Stein wrote in his own name we could dismiss his arrogance without more ado. But he writes in the name of "Cultural Freedom" and apparently speaks for a Committee formed to advance "Cultural Freedom." The Committee's officers include Norman Thomas, George Counts, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., David Riesman, Richard Rovere, Elliott Cohen, Peter Viereck, Hans Kohn and others. And so I for one want to be told: did they approve Mr. Stein's statement issued in their name? And: do they endorse it now?

Does Mr. Viereck, with his regard for the continuity of legal traditions, share Mr. Stein's disdain for due process? Or does Norman Thomas share Stein's view that "apologists" who break no law, are the legitimate objects of Congressional investigators?

Perhaps the liberals recall the spirit of those who wrote the 1st and 5th Amendments, those who wanted to assure protection to unpopular persons. Perhaps Mr. Viereck, who likewise knows his history, recalls John Kilbourne and William Bradford the printer, and what their trials meant to those who drafted the Bill of Rights. I suspect some of those who agree with Mr. Stein have memories reaching only to the Second International, and not to the Constitutional Convention.

Mr. Stein has no apparent quarrel with the McCarran Committee. In his view its investigation of Lattimore "was certainly worth the cost to the American taxpayer."

I really want to know: how do the officers of Mr. Stein's Committee for Cultural Freedom feel about this?

BRIAN GILBERT

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Mr. Gilbert's article, together with Mr. Stein's statement for the committee and Mr. Gilbert's rejoinder have been sent to the officers of the Committee for Cultural Freedom for comment. Space permitting we shall publish their replies.]

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

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

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

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

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

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